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ABSTRACT
We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets. The motivating examples are
the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network.
We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the
difference between users' willingness to pay and delay costs. We characterize a tight bound of 5/6
on efficiency in pure strategy equilibria. This bound is tight even when the number of routes and
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MIT1 Introduction
We analyze price competition in the presence of congestion costs. Consider the following
environment: one unit of tra±c can use one of I alternative routes. More tra±c on a
particular route causes delays, exerting a negative (congestion) externality on existing
tra±c.1 Congestion costs are captured by a route-speci¯c non-decreasing convex latency
function, li (¢). Pro¯t-maximizing oligopolists set prices (tolls) for travel on each route
denoted by pi. We analyze subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this environment, where
for each price vector, p, all tra±c chooses the path that has minimum (toll plus delay)
cost, li + pi, and oligopolists choose prices to maximize pro¯ts.
The environment we analyze is of practical importance for a number of settings.
These include transportation and communication networks, where additional use of a
route (path) generates greater congestion for all users, and markets in which there are
\snob" e®ects, so that goods consumed by fewer other consumers are more valuable (see
for example, [38]). The key feature of these environments is the negative congestion
externality that users exert on others. This externality has been well-recognized since
the work by Pigou [27] in economics, by Samuelson [33], Wardrop [41], Beckmann et al.
[4] in transportation networks, and by Orda et. al. [23], Korilis et. al. [18], Kelly [17],
Low [20] in communication networks. More recently, there has been a growing literature
that focuses on quanti¯cation of e±ciency loss (referred to as the price of anarchy) that
results from externalities and strategic behavior in di®erent classes of problems; sel¯sh
routing (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [19], Roughgarden and Tardos [31], Correa,
Schulz, and Stier-Moses [8], Perakis [26], and Friedman [12]), resource allocation by
market mechanisms (Johari and Tsitsiklis [16], Sanghavi and Hajek [32]), and network
design (Anshelevich et.al. [2]). Nevertheless, the game-theoretic interactions between
(multiple) service providers and users, or the e®ects of competition among the providers
on the e±ciency loss has not been considered. This is an important area for analysis
since in most applications, (competing) pro¯t-maximizing entities charge prices for use.
Moreover, we will show that the nature of the analysis changes signi¯cantly in the
presence of price competition.
We provide a general framework for the analysis of price competition among providers
in a congested (and potentially capacitated) network, study existence of pure strategy
and mixed strategy equilibria, and characterize and quantify the e±ciency properties of
equilibria. There are four sets of major results from our analysis.
First, though the equilibrium of tra±c assignment without prices can be highly
ine±cient (e.g., [27], [31], [8]), price-setting by a monopolist internalizes the negative
externality and achieves e±ciency.
Second, increasing competition can increase ine±ciency. In fact, changing the market
structure from monopoly to duopoly almost always increases ine±ciency. This result
contrasts with most existing results in the economics literature where greater competition
tends to improve the allocation of resources (e.g. see Tirole [36]). The intuition for this
result is driven by the presence of congestion and is illustrated by the example we discuss
below.2
1An externality arises when the actions of the player in a game a®ects the payo® of other players.
2Because users are homogeneous and have a constant reservation utility in our model, in the absence
1Third, we provide a tight bound on the extent of ine±ciency in the presence of
pricing, which applies irrespective of the number of routes, I. We show that social
surplus (de¯ned as the di®erence between users' willingness to pay and the delay cost)
in any pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium is always greater than 5/6 of the maximum
social surplus. Simple examples reach this 5/6 bound. Interestingly, this bound is
obtained even when the number of routes, I, is arbitrarily large.
Fourth, pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist. This is not surprising in view of
the fact that what we have here is a version of a Bertrand-Edgeworth game where pure
strategy equilibria do not exist in the presence of convex costs of production or capac-
ity constraints (e.g., Edgeworth [11], Shubik [35], Benassy [6], Vives [40]). However,
in our oligopoly environment we show that when latency functions are linear, a pure
strategy equilibrium always exists, essentially because some amount of congestion ex-
ternalities remove the payo® discontinuities inherent in the Bertrand-Edgeworth game.
Non-existence becomes an issue in our environment when latency functions are highly
convex. In this case, we prove that mixed strategy equilibria always exist. We also show
that mixed strategy equilibria can lead to arbitrarily ine±cient worst-case realizations;
in particular, social surplus can become arbitrarily small relative to the maximum social
surplus.
The following example illustrates some of these results.
Example 1 Figure 1 shows a situation similar to the one ¯rst analyzed by Pigou [27]
to highlight the ine±ciency due to congestion externalities. One unit of tra±c will travel









It is straightforward to see that the e±cient allocation [i.e., one that minimizes the total
delay cost
P
i li(xi)xi] is xS
1 = 2=3 and xS
2 = 1=3, while the (Wardrop) equilibrium
allocation that equates delay on the two paths is xWE
1 ¼ :73 > xS
1 and xWE
2 ¼ :27 < xS
2.
The source of the ine±ciency is that each unit of tra±c does not internalize the greater
increase in delay from travel on route 1, so there is too much use of this route relative
to the e±cient allocation.
Now consider a monopolist controlling both routes and setting prices for travel to
maximize its pro¯ts. We will show in greater detail below that in this case, the monop-
olist will set a price including a markup, xil0
i (when li is di®erentiable), which exactly
internalizes the congestion externality. In other words, this markup is equivalent to the
Pigovian tax that a social planner would set in order to induce decentralized tra±c to




2 = (2=32)+k, for some constant k. The resulting tra±c




Next consider a duopoly situation, where each route is controlled by a di®erent pro¯t-
maximizing provider. In this case, it can be shown that equilibrium prices will take the
of congestion externalities, all market structures would achieve e±ciency, and a change from monopoly








Figure 1: A two link network with congestion-dependant latency functions.
form pOE
i = xi (l0
1 + l0
2) [see Eq. (20) in Section 4], or more speci¯cally, pOE
1 ¼ 0:61 and
pOE
2 ¼ 0:44. The resulting equilibrium tra±c is xOE
1 ¼ :58 < xS
1 and xOE
2 ¼ :42 > xS
2,
which also di®ers from the e±cient allocation. We will show that this is generally the case
in the oligopoly equilibrium. Interestingly, while in the Wardrop equilibrium without
prices, there was too much tra±c on route 1, now there is too little tra±c because
of its greater markup. It is also noteworthy that although the duopoly equilibrium
is ine±cient relative to the monopoly equilibrium, in the monopoly equilibrium k is
chosen such that all of the consumer surplus is captured by the monopolist, while in the
oligopoly equilibrium users may have positive consumer surplus.3
The intuition for the ine±ciency of duopoly relative to monopoly can be obtained as
follows. There is now a new source of (di®erential) monopoly power for each duopolist,
which they exploit by distorting the pattern of tra±c: when provider 1, controlling route
1, charges a higher price, it realizes that this will push some tra±c from route 1 to route
2, raising congestion on route 2. But this makes the tra±c using route 1 become more
\locked-in," because their outside option, travel on the route 2, has become worse.4 As
a result, the optimal price that each duopolist charges will include an additional markup
over the Pigovian markup. These are x1l0
2 for route 1 and x2l0
1 for route 2. Since these
two markups are generally di®erent, they will distort the pattern of tra±c away from
the e±cient allocation. Naturally, however, prices are typically lower with duopoly, so
even though social surplus declines, users will be better o® than in monopoly (i.e., they
will command a positive consumer surplus).
Although there is a large literature on models of congestion both in transportation
and communication networks, very few studies have investigated the implications of
having the \property rights" over routes assigned to pro¯t-maximizing providers. In [3],
Basar and Srikant analyze monopoly pricing under speci¯c assumptions on the utility
and latency functions. He and Walrand [15] study competition and cooperation among
internet service providers under speci¯c demand models. Issues of e±cient allocation of
3Consumer surplus is de¯ned as the di®erence between users' willingness to pay and e®ective costs,
pi + li(xi), and is thus di®erent from social surplus (which is the di®erence between users' willingness
to pay and latency cost, li(xi), thus also takes into account producer surplus/pro¯ts). See Mas-Colell,
Winston, and Green [21].
4Using economics terminology, we could also say that the demand for route 1 becomes more \inelas-
tic". Since this term has a di®erent meaning in the communication networks literature (see [34]), we
do not use it here.
3°ows or tra±c across routes do not arise in these papers. Our previous work [1] studies
the monopoly problem and contains the e±ciency of the monopoly result (with inelastic
tra±c and more restrictive assumptions on latencies), but none of the other results here.
To minimize overlap, we discuss the monopoly problem only brie°y in this paper.
In the rest of the paper, we use the terminology of a (communication) network,
though all of the analysis applies to resource allocation in transportation networks,
electricity markets, and other economic applications. Section 2 describes the basic en-
vironment. Section 3 brie°y characterizes the monopoly equilibrium and establishes
its e±ciency. Section 4 de¯nes and characterizes the oligopoly equilibria with compet-
ing pro¯t-maximizing providers. Section 5 contains the main results and characterizes
the e±ciency properties of the oligopoly equilibrium and provide bounds on e±ciency.
Section 6 contains concluding comments.
Regarding notation, all vectors are viewed as column vectors, and inequalities are to
be interpreted componentwise. We denote by RI
+ the set of nonnegative I-dimensional
vectors. Let Ci be a closed subset of [0;1) and let f : Ci 7! R be a convex function. We
use @f(x) to denote the set of subgradients of f at x, and f¡(x) and f+(x) to denote
the left and right derivatives of f at x.
2 Model
We consider a network with I parallel links. Let I = f1;:::;Ig denote the set of links.
Let xi denote the total °ow on link i, and x = [x1;:::;xI] denote the vector of link °ows.
Each link in the network has a °ow-dependent latency function li(xi), which measures
the travel time (or delay) as a function of the total °ow on link i. We denote the price
per unit °ow (bandwidth) of link i by pi. Let p = [p1;:::;pI] denote the vector of prices.
We are interested in the problem of routing d units of °ow across the I links. We as-
sume that this is the aggregate °ow of many \small" users and thus adopt the Wardrop's
principle (see [41]) in characterizing the °ow distribution in the network; i.e., the °ows
are routed along paths with minimum e®ective cost, de¯ned as the sum of the latency
at the given °ow and the price of that path (see the de¯nition below). Wardrop's prin-
ciple is used extensively in modelling tra±c behavior in transportation networks ([4],
[9], [25]) and communication networks ([31], [8]). We also assume that the users have
a reservation utility R and decide not to send their °ow if the e®ective cost exceeds
the reservation utility. This implies that user preferences can be represented by the
piecewise linear aggregate utility function u(¢) depicted in Figure 2.5
De¯nition 1 For a given price vector p ¸ 0,6 a vector xWE 2 RI
+ is a Wardrop
5This simplifying assumption implies that all users are \homogeneous" in the sense that they have
the same reservation utility, R. We discuss potential issues in extending this work to users with elastic
and heterogeneous requirements in the concluding section.
6Since the reservation utility of users is equal to R, we can also restrict attention to pi · R for all





Figure 2: Aggregate utility function.
equilibrium (WE) if
x









i ) ¡ pi)xi
)
: (1)
We denote the set of WE at a given p by W(p).
We adopt the following assumption on the latency functions throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 For each i 2 I, the latency function li : [0;1) 7! [0;1] is proper closed
convex, nondecreasing, and satis¯es li(0) = 0.
Hence, we allow the latency functions to be extended real-valued (see [7]). Let
Ci = fx 2 [0;1) j li(x) < 1g denote the e®ective domain of li. By Assumption 1,
Ci is a closed interval of the form [0;b] or [0;1). Let bCi = supx2Ci x. Without loss of
generality, we can add the constraint xi 2 Ci in Eq. (1). Using the optimality conditions
for problem (1), we see that a vector xWE 2 RI




and there exists some ¸ ¸ 0 such that ¸(
PI
i=1 xWE
i ¡ d) = 0 and for all i,
R ¡ li(x
WE
i ) ¡ pi · ¸ if x
WE
i = 0; (2)
= ¸ if 0 < x
WE
i < bCi;
¸ ¸ if x
WE
i = bCi:
When the latency functions are real-valued [i.e., Ci = [0;1)], we obtain the following
characterization of a WE, which is often used as the de¯nition of a WE in the literature.
This lemma states that in the WE, the e®ective costs, de¯ned as li(xWE
i ) + pi, are
equalized on all links with positive °ows (proof omitted).
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 hold, and assume further that Ci = [0;1) for all i 2 I.
Then a nonnegative vector x¤ 2 W(p) if and only if
li(x
¤




j) + pjg; 8 i with x
¤
i > 0; (3)
5li(x
¤











i = d if minj flj(xj) + pjg < R.
Example 2 below shows that condition (3) in this lemma may not hold when the
latency functions are not real-valued. Next we establish the existence of a WE.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Continuity) Let Assumption 1 hold. For any price
vector p ¸ 0, the set of WE, W(p), is nonempty. Moreover, the correspondence W :
RI
+ ¶ RI
+ is upper semicontinuous.















xi 2 Ci; 8 i:
In view of Assumption (1) (i.e., li is nondecreasing for all i), it can be shown that the
objective function of problem (4) is convex over the constraint set, which is nonempty
(since 0 2 Ci) and convex. Moreover, the ¯rst order optimality conditions of problem
(4), which are also su±cient conditions for optimality, are identical to the WE optimality
conditions [cf. Eq. (2)] . Hence a °ow vector xWE 2 W(p) if and only if it is an optimal
solution of problem (4). Since the objective function of problem (4) is continuous and
the constraint set is compact, this problem has an optimal solution, showing that W(p)
is nonempty. The fact that W is an upper semicontinuous correspondence at every p
follows by using the Theorem of the Maximum (see Berge [5], chapter 6) for problem
(4). Q.E.D.
WE °ows satisfy intuitive monotonicity properties given in the following proposition.
The proof follows from the optimality conditions [cf. Eq. (2)] and is omitted (see [1]).
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity) Let Assumption 1 hold. For a given p ¸ 0, let
p¡j = [pi]i6=j.
(a) For some ¹ p · p, let ¹ x 2 W(¹ p) and x 2 W(p). Then,
PI
i=1 ¹ xi ¸
PI
i=1 xi.
(b) For some ¹ pj < pj, let ¹ x 2 W(¹ pj;p¡j) and x 2 W(pj;p¡j). Then ¹ xj ¸ xj and ¹ xi · xi,
for all i 6= j.
(c) For some e I ½ I, suppose that ¹ pj < pj for all j 2 e I and ¹ pj = pj for all j = 2 e I, and
let ¹ x 2 W(¹ p) and x 2 W(p). Then
P
j2e I xj(¹ p) ¸
P
j2e I xj(p).
6For a given price vector p, the WE need not be unique in general. The following
example illustrates some properties of the WE.
Example 2 Consider a two link network. Let the total °ow be d = 1 and the reserva-
tion utility be R = 1. Assume that the latency functions are given by
l1(x) = l2(x) =
½
0 if 0 · x · 2
3
1 otherwise:
At the price vector (p1;p2) = (1;1), the set of WE, W(p), is given by the set of all
vectors (x1;x2) with 0 · xi · 2=3 and
P
i xi · 1. At any price vector (p1;p2) with
p1 > p2 = 1, W(p) is given by all (0;x2) with 0 · x2 · 2=3.
This example also illustrates that Lemma 1 need not hold when latency functions
are not real-valued. Consider, for instance, the price vector (p1;p2) = (1 ¡ ²;1 ¡ a²)
for some scalar a > 1. In this case, the unique WE is (x1;x2) = (1=3;2=3), and clearly
e®ective costs on the two routes are not equalized despite the fact that they both have
positive °ows. This arises because the path with the lower e®ective cost is capacity
constrained, so no more tra±c can use that path.
Under further restrictions on the li, we obtain the following standard result in the
literature which assumes strictly increasing latency functions.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness) Let Assumption 1 hold. Assume further that li is
strictly increasing over Ci. For any price vector p ¸ 0, the set of WE, W(p), is a
singleton. Moreover, the function W : RI
+ 7! RI
+ is continuous.
Proof. Under the given assumptions, for any p ¸ 0, the objective function of problem
(4) is strictly convex, and therefore has a unique optimal solution. This shows the
uniqueness of the WE at a given p. Since the correspondence W is upper semicontinuous
from Proposition 1 and single-valued, it is continuous. Q.E.D.
In general, under the Assumption that li(0) = 0 for all i 2 I, we have the following
result, which is essential in our analysis with nonunique WE °ows.
Lemma 2 Let Assumption 1 hold. For a given p ¸ 0, de¯ne the set
¹ I = fi 2 I j 9 x; ¹ x 2 W(p) with xi 6= ¹ xig: (5)
Then
li(xi) = 0; 8 i 2 ¹ I; 8 x 2 W(p);
pi = pj; 8 i; j 2 ¹ I:
7Proof. Consider some i 2 ¹ I and x 2 W(p). Since i 2 ¹ I, there exists some ^ x 2 W(p)
such that xi 6= ^ xi. Assume without loss of generality that xi > ^ xi. There are two cases
to consider:




j2I ^ xj, which implies that the WE
optimality conditions [cf. Eq. (2)] for ^ x hold with ^ ¸ = 0. By Eq. (2) and xi > ^ xi,
we have
li(xi) + pi · R;
li(^ xi) + pi ¸ R;
which together imply that li(xi) = li(^ xi). By Assumption 1 (i.e., li is convex and
li(0) = 0), it follows that li(xi) = 0.
(b) If xk < ^ xk for some k, by the WE optimality conditions, we obtain
li(xi) + pi · lk(xk) + pk;
li(^ xi) + ^ pi ¸ lk(^ xk) + pk:
Combining the above with xi > ^ xi and xk < ^ xk, we see that li(xi) = li(^ xi); and
lk(xk) = lk(^ xk). By Assumption 1, this shows that li(xi) = 0 (and also that
pi = pk).
Next consider some i; j 2 ¹ I. We will show that pi = pj. Since i 2 ¹ I, there exist
x; ^ x 2 W(p) such that xi > ^ xi. There are three cases to consider:
² xj < ^ xj. Then a similar argument to part (b) above shows that pi = pj.
² xj > ^ xj. If xk ¸ ^ xk for all k 6= i;j, then
P
m ^ xm < d, implying that the WE
optimality conditions hold with ^ ¸ = 0. Therefore, we have
li(xi) + pi · R;
lj(^ xj) + pj ¸ R;
which together with li(xi) = lj(^ xj) = 0 imply that pi = pj.
² xj = ^ xj. Since j 2 ¹ I, there exists some ¹ x 2 W(p) such that xj 6= ¹ xj. Repeating
the above two steps with ¹ xj instead of ^ xj yields the desired result.
Q.E.D.
We next de¯ne the social problem and the social optimum, which is the routing (°ow
allocation) that would be chosen by a planner that has full information and full control
over the network.













In view of Assumption 1, the social problem has a continuous objective function and
a compact constraint set, guaranteeing the existence of a social optimum, xS. Moreover,
using the optimality conditions for a convex program (see [7], Section 4.7), we see that
a vector xS 2 RI
+ is a social optimum if and only if
PI
i=1 xS
i · d and there exists a
subgradient gli 2 @li(xS
i ) for each i, and a ¸S ¸ 0 such that ¸S(
PI
i=1 xS




i ) ¡ x
S
i gli · ¸S if x
S
i = 0; (7)
= ¸S if 0 < x
S
i < bCi;
¸ ¸S if x
S
i = bCi:
For future reference, for a given vector x 2 RI
+, we de¯ne the value of the objective




(R ¡ li(xi))xi; (8)
as the social surplus, i.e., the di®erence between users' willingness to pay and the total
latency.
3 Monopoly Equilibrium and E±ciency
In this section, we assume that a monopolist service provider owns the I links and
charges a price of pi per unit bandwidth on link i. We considered a related problem in
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] for atomic users with inelastic tra±c (i.e., the utility function
of each of a ¯nite set of users is a step function), and with increasing, real-valued and
di®erentiable latency functions. Here we show that similar results hold for the more
general latency functions and the demand model considered in Section 2.





where x 2 W(p). This de¯nes a two-stage dynamic pricing-congestion game, where the
monopolist sets prices anticipating the demand of users, and given the prices (i.e., in
each subgame), users choose their °ow vectors according to the WE.




ME) ¸ ¦(p;x); 8 p; 8 x 2 W (p):
Our de¯nition of the ME is stronger than the standard subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium concept for dynamic games. With a slight abuse of terminology, let us associate
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the on-the-equilibrium-path actions of the
two-stage game.
De¯nition 4 A vector (p¤;x¤) ¸ 0 is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the





The following proposition shows that under Assumption 1, the two solution concepts
coincide. Since the proof is not relevant for the rest of the argument, we provide it in
Appendix A.
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. A vector (pME;xME) is an ME if and only if
it is an SPE of the pricing-congestion game.





subject to x 2 W(p);
it is slightly easier to work with than an SPE. Therefore, we use ME as the solution
concept in this paper.
The preceding problem has an optimal solution, which establishes the existence of an
ME. In the next proposition, we show that the °ow allocation at an ME and the social
optimum are the same.
Proposition 5 Let Assumption 1 hold. A vector x is the °ow vector at an ME if and
only if it is a social optimum.
To prove this result, we ¯rst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. Let (p;x) be an ME. Then for all i with xi > 0, we
have
pi = R ¡ li(xi):
10Proof. De¯ne ¹ I = fi 2 I j xi > 0g. By the de¯nition of a WE, for all i 2 ¹ I, we have
pi + li(xi) · R. We ¯rst show that
li(xi) + pi = lj(xj) + pj; 8 i;j 2 ¹ I:
Suppose li(xi) + pi < lj(xj) + pj for some i;j 2 ¹ I. Using the optimality conditions for
a WE [cf. Eq. (2)], we see that x 2 W(pi + ²;p¡i) for su±ciently small ², contradicting
the fact that (p;x) is an ME. Assume next that pi+li(xi) < R for some i 2 ¹ I. Consider
the price vector ~ p = p + ²
P
i2¹ I ei, where ei is the ith unit vector and ² is such that
pi + ² + li(xi) < R; 8 i 2 ¹ I:
Hence, x is a WE at price ~ p, and therefore the vector (~ p;x) is feasible for problem (9)
and has a strictly higher objective function value, contradicting the fact that (p;x) is an
ME. Q.E.D.












This problem is identical to the social problem [cf. problem (6)], completing the proof.
Q.E.D.
In addition to the social surplus de¯ned above, it is also useful to de¯ne the con-
sumer surplus, as the di®erence between users' willingness to pay and e®ective cost, i.e., PI
i=1 (R ¡ li(xi) ¡ pi)xi (See Mas-Colell, Winston and Green, [21]). By Proposition 5
and Lemma 3, it is clear that even though the ME achieves the social optimum, all of
the surplus is captured by the monopolist, and users are just indi®erent between sending
their information or not (i.e., receive no consumer surplus).
Our major motivation for the study of oligopolistic settings is that they provide
a better approximation to reality, where there is typically competition among service
providers. A secondary motivation is to see whether an oligopoly equilibrium will achieve
an e±cient allocation like the ME, while also transferring some or all of the surplus to
the consumers.
4 Oligopoly Equilibrium
We suppose that there are S service providers, denote the set of service providers by
S, and assume that each service provider s 2 S owns a di®erent subset Is of the links.
Service provider s charges a price pi per unit bandwidth on link i 2 Is. Given the vector






for x 2 W(ps;p¡s), where ps = [pi]i2Is.
The objective of each service provider, like the monopolist in the previous section,
is to maximize pro¯ts. Because their pro¯ts depend on the prices set by other service
providers, each service provider forms conjectures about the actions of other service
providers, as well as the behavior of users, which, we assume, they do according to the
notion of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. We refer to the game among service
providers as the price competition game.
De¯nition 5 A vector (pOE;xOE) ¸ 0 is a (pure strategy) Oligopoly Equilibrium (OE)














¡s ;x); 8 ps ¸ 0; 8 x 2 W(ps;p
OE
¡s ): (10)
We refer to pOE as the OE price.
As for the monopoly case, there is a close relation between a pure strategy OE and
a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. Again associating the subgame perfect
equilibrium with the on-the-equilibrium-path actions, we have the following standard
de¯nition.
De¯nition 6 A vector (p¤;x¤) ¸ 0 is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the price
competition game if x¤ 2 W (p¤) and there exists a function x(p) 2 W (p) such that for














) 8 ps ¸ 0: (11)
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 4 and enables us to work with the
OE de¯nition, which is more convenient for the subsequent analysis. The proof parallels
that of Proposition 4 and is omitted.
Proposition 6 Let Assumption 1 hold. A vector (pOE;xOE) is an OE if and only if it
is an SPE of the price competition game.
The price competition game is neither concave nor supermodular. Therefore, classical
arguments that are used to show the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium do not hold
(see [13], [37]). In the next proposition, we show that for linear latency functions, there
exists a pure strategy OE.
Proposition 7 Let Assumption 1 hold, and assume further that the latency functions
are linear. Then the price competition game has a pure strategy OE.
12Proof. For all i 2 I, let li(x) = aix. De¯ne the set
I0 = fi 2 I j ai = 0g:
Let I0 denote the cardinality of set I0. There are two cases to consider:
² I0 ¸ 2: Assume that there exist i; j 2 I0 such that i 2 Is and j 2 Is0 for some
s 6= s0 2 S. Then it can be seen that a vector (pOE;xOE) with pOE
i = 0 for all
i 2 I0 and xOE 2 W(pOE) is an OE. Assume next that for all i 2 I0, we have i 2 Is
for some s 2 S. Then, we can assume without loss of generality that provider s
owns a single link i0 with ai0 = 0 and consider the case I0 = 1.
² I0 · 1: Let Bs(pOE












Let B(pOE) = [Bs(pOE
¡s )]s2S. In view of the linearity of the latency functions, it
follows that B(pOE) is an upper semicontinuous and convex-valued correspondence.
Hence, we can use Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem to assert the existence of a pOE
such that B(pOE) = pOE (see Berge [5]). To complete the proof, it remains to be
shown that there exists xOE 2 W(pOE) such that Eq. (10) holds.
If I0 = ;, we have by Proposition 3 that W(pOE) is a singleton, and therefore Eq.
(10) holds and (pOE;W(pOE)) is an OE.
Assume ¯nally that exactly one of the ai's (without loss of generality a1) is equal
to 0. We show that for all ¹ x; ~ x 2 W(pOE), we have ¹ xi = ~ xi, for all i 6= 1. Let
EC(x;pOE) = minjflj(xj) + pOE
j g. If at least one of
EC(~ x;p
OE) < R; or EC(¹ x;p
OE) < R
holds, then one can show that
PI
i=1 ~ xi =
PI
i=1 ¹ xi = d. Substituting x1 = d ¡ P
i2I; i6=1 xi in problem (4), we see that the objective function of problem (4) is
strictly convex in x¡1 = [xi]i6=1, thus showing that ~ x = ¹ x. If both EC(~ x;pOE) = R
and EC(¹ x;pOE) = R, then ¹ xi = ~ xi = l
¡1
i (R ¡ pOE
i ) for all i 6= 1, establishing our
claim.
For some x 2 W(pOE), consider the vector xOE = (d¡
P
i6=1 xi;x¡1) . Since x¡1 is
uniquely de¯ned and x1 is chosen such that the provider that owns link 1 has no
incentive to deviate, it follows that (pOE;xOE) is an OE.
Q.E.D.
The existence result cannot be generalized to piecewise linear latency functions or
to latency functions which are linear over their e®ective domain, as illustrated in the
following example.
13Example 3 Consider a two link network. Let the total °ow be d = 1. Assume that the
latency functions are given by
l1(x) = 0; l2(x) =
½
0 if 0 · x · ±
x¡±
² x ¸ ±;
for some ² > 0 and ± > 1=2, with the convention that when ² = 0, l2(x) = 1 for x > ±.
We ¯rst show that there exists no pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium for small ² (i.e.,
there exists no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium). The following list considers
all candidate oligopoly price equilibria (p1;p2) and pro¯table unilateral deviations for ²
su±ciently small, thus establishing the nonexistence of an OE:
1. p1 = p2 = 0: A small increase in the price of provider 1 will generate positive
pro¯ts, thus provider 1 has an incentive to deviate.
2. p1 = p2 > 0: Let x be the °ow allocation at the OE. If x1 = 1, then provider 2
has an incentive to decrease its price. If x1 < 1, then provider 1 has an incentive
to decrease its price.
3. 0 · p1 < p2: Player 1 has an incentive to increase its price since its °ow allocation
remains the same.
4. 0 · p2 < p1: For ² su±ciently small, the pro¯t function of player 2, given p1, is
strictly increasing as a function of p2, showing that provider 2 has an incentive to
increase its price.
We next show that a mixed strategy OE always exists. We de¯ne a mixed strategy
OE as a mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the price competition game (see
Dasgupta and Maskin, [10]). Let Bn be the space of all (Borel) probability measures
on [0;R]n. Let Is denote the cardinality of Is, i.e., the number of links controlled by
service provider s. Let ¹s 2 BIs be a probability measure, and denote the vector of these
probability measures by ¹ and the vector of these probability measures excluding s by
¹¡s.
De¯nition 7 (¹¤;x¤(p)) is a mixed strategy Oligopoly Equilibrium (OE) if the function






















for all s and ¹s 2 BIs.
Therefore, a mixed strategy OE simply requires that there is no pro¯table deviation
to a di®erent probability measure for each oligopolist.
14Example 3 (continued) We now show that the following strategy pro¯le is a mixed
strategy OE for the above game when ² ! 0 (a mixed strategy OE also exists when





0 0 · p · R(1 ¡ ±);
1 ¡
(1¡±)R










±p R(1 ¡ ±) · p · R;
1 otherwise.
Notice that ¹1 has an atom equal to 1 ¡ ± at R. To verify that this pro¯le is a mixed
strategy OE, let ¹0 be the density of ¹, with the convention that ¹0 = 1 when there is
an atom at that point. Let Mi = fp j ¹0
i (p) > 0g: To establish that (¹1;¹2) is a mixed
strategy equilibrium, it su±ces to show that the expected payo® to player i is constant
for all pi 2 Mi when the other player chooses p¡i according to ¹¡i (see [24]). These
expected payo®s are




which are constant for all pi 2 Mi for i = 1;2. This establishes that (¹1;¹2) is a mixed
strategy OE.
The next proposition shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 8 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the price competition game has a mixed
strategy OE, (¹OE;xOE(p)).
The proof of this proposition is long and not directly related the rest of the argument,
so it is given in Appendix B.
We next provide an explicit characterization of pure strategy OE. Though of also
independent interest, these results are most useful for us to quantify the e±ciency loss
of oligopoly in the next section.
The following lemma shows that an equivalent to Lemma 1 (which required real-
valued latency functions) also holds with more general latency functions at the pure
strategy OE.
Lemma 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. If (pOE;xOE) is a pure strategy OE, then
li(x
OE






j ) + p
OE
j g; 8 i with x
OE





i · R; 8 i with x
OE









i = d if minjflj(xOE
j ) + pjg < R.
Proof. Let (pOE;xOE) be an OE. Since xOE 2 W(pOE), conditions (14) and (15) follow
by the de¯nition of a WE. Consider condition (13). Assume that there exist some i;j 2 I
with xOE
i > 0, xOE
j > 0 such that
li(x
OE




j ) + p
OE
j :
Using the optimality conditions for a WE [cf. Eq. (2)], this implies that xOE
i = bCi. Con-
sider changing pOE
i to pOE
i + ² for some ² > 0. By checking the optimality conditions,
we see that we can choose ² su±ciently small such that xOE 2 W(pOE
i + ²;pOE
¡i ). Hence
service provider that owns link i can deviate to pOE
i + ² and increase its pro¯ts, contra-
dicting the fact that (pOE;xOE) is an OE. Finally, assume to arrive at the contradiction
that minjflj(xOE
j ) + pjg < R and
PI
i=1 xOE
i < d. Using the optimality conditions for a
WE [Eq. (2) with ¸ = 0 since
PI
i=1 xOE
i < d], this implies that we must have xOE
i = bCi
for some i. With a similar argument to above, a deviation to pOE
i + ² keeps xOE as a
WE, and is more pro¯table, completing the proof. Q.E.D.
We need the following additional assumption for our price characterization.
Assumption 2 Given a pure strategy OE (pOE;xOE), if for some i 2 I with xOE
i > 0,
we have li(xOE
i ) = 0, then Is = fig.
Note that this assumption is automatically satis¯ed if all latency functions are strictly
increasing or if all service providers own only one link.
Lemma 5 Let (pOE;xOE) be a pure strategy OE. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let
¦s denote the pro¯t of service provider s at (pOE;xOE).
(a) If ¦s0 > 0 for some s0 2 S, then ¦s > 0 for all s 2 S.
(b) If ¦s > 0 for some s 2 S, then pOE
j xOE
j > 0 for all j 2 Is.
Proof.
(a) For some j 2 Is0, de¯ne K = pOE
j +lj(xOE
j ), which is positive since ¦s0 > 0. Assume
¦s = 0 for some s. For k 2 Is, consider the price ¹ pk = K ¡ ² > 0 for some small
² > 0. It can be seen that at the price vector (¹ pk;pOE
¡k ), the corresponding WE link
°ow would satisfy ¹ xk > 0. Hence, service provider s has an incentive to deviate to
¹ pk at which he will make positive pro¯t, contradicting the fact that (pOE;xOE) is
a pure strategy OE.
(b) Since ¦s > 0, we have pOE
m xOE
m > 0 for some m 2 Is. By Assumption 2, we can
assume without loss of generality that lm(xOE
m ) > 0 (otherwise, we are done). Let
j 2 Is and assume to arrive at a contradiction that pOE
j xOE
j = 0. The pro¯t of
service provider s at the pure strategy OE can be written as





16where ¹ ¦s denotes the pro¯ts from links other than m and j. Let pOE
m = K¡lm(xOE
m )
for some K. Consider changing the prices pOE
m and pOE
j such that the new pro¯t is




m ¡ ²) + ²(K ¡ lj(²)):
Note that ² units of °ow are moved from link m to link j such that the °ows of
other links remain the same at the new WE. Hence, the change in the pro¯t is
~ ¦s ¡ ¦s = (lm(x
OE






m ¡ ²) ¡ lj(²))):
Since lm(xOE
m ) > 0, ² can be chosen su±ciently small such that the above is strictly
positive, contradicting the fact that (pOE;xOE) is an OE. Q.E.D.
The following example shows that Assumption 2 cannot be dispensed with for part
(b) of this lemma.
Example 4 Consider a three link network with two providers, where provider 1 owns
links 1 and 3 and provider 2 owns link 2. Let the total °ow be d = 1 and the reservation
utility be R = 1. Assume that the latency functions are given by
l1 (x1) = 0; l2 (x2) = x2; l3 (x3) = ax3;
for some a > 0. Any price vector (p1;p2;p3) = (2=3;1=3;b) with b ¸ 2=3 and (x1;x2;x3) =
(2=3;1=3;0) is a pure strategy OE, so p3x3 = 0 contrary to part (b) of the lemma. To
see why this is an equilibrium, note that provider 2 is clearly playing a best response.
Moreover, in this allocation ¦1 = 4=9. We can represent any deviation of provider 1 by
(p1;p3) = (2=3 ¡ ±;2=3 ¡ a² ¡ ±);
for two scalars ² and ± , which will induce a WE of (x1;x2;x3) = (2=3 + ± ¡ ²;1=3 ¡ ±;²):
The corresponding pro¯t of provider 1 at this deviation is ¦1 = 4=9 ¡ ±2 < 4=9, estab-
lishing that provider 1 is also playing a best response and we have a pure strategy OE.
We next establish that under an additional assumption, a pure strategy OE will
never be at a point of non-di®erentiability of the latency functions.
Assumption 3 There exists some s 2 S such that li is real-valued and continuously
di®erentiable for all i 2 Is .
Lemma 6 Let (pOE;xOE) be an OE with minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE
j )g < R and pOE
i xOE
i > 0













i ) and l
¡
i (xOE
i ) are the right and left derivatives of the function li at xOE
i
respectively.
Since the proof of this lemma is long, it is given in Appendix C. Note that Assumption
3 cannot be dispensed with in this lemma. This is illustrated in the next example.
17Example 5 Consider a two link network. Let the total °ow be d = 1 and the reserva-
tion utility be R = 2. Assume that the latency functions are given by
l1(x) = l2(x) =
½








It can be veri¯ed that the vector (pOE
1 ;pOE
2 ) = (1;1), with (xOE
1 ;xOE
2 ) = (1=2;1=2) is a
pure strategy OE, and is at a point of non-di®erentiability for both latency functions.
We next provide an explicit characterization of the OE prices, which is essential in
our e±ciency analysis in Section 5. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Proposition 9 Let (pOE;xOE) be an OE such that pOE
i xOE
i > 0 for some i 2 I. Let
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
a) Assume that minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE










i ); if l0
j(xOE














b) Assume that minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE




























If the latency functions li are all real-valued and continuously di®erentiable, then
analysis of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for oligopoly problem [Eq. (78) in Appendix
D] immediately yields the following result:
Corollary 1 Let (pOE;xOE) be an OE such that pOE
i xOE
i > 0 for some i 2 I. Let As-
sumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume also that li is real-valued and continuously di®erentiable










i ); if l0
j(xOE



















This corollary also implies that in the two link case with real-valued and continuously















as claimed in the Introduction.
185 E±ciency of Oligopoly Equilibria
In this section, we study the e±ciency properties of oligopoly pricing. We take as our
measure of e±ciency the ratio of the social surplus of the equilibrium °ow allocation to
the social surplus of the social optimum, S(x¤)=S(xS); where x¤ refers to the monopoly
or the oligopoly equilibrium [cf. Eq. (8)]. In Section 3, we showed that the °ow alloca-
tion at a monopoly equilibrium is a social optimum. Hence, in congestion games with
monopoly pricing, there is no e±ciency loss. The following example shows that this is
not necessarily the case in oligopoly pricing.
Example 6 Consider a two link network. Let the total °ow be d = 1 and the reservation
utility be R = 1. The latency functions are given by




The unique social optimum for this example is xS = (1;0). The unique ME (pME;xME)
is xME = (1;0) and pME = (1;1). As expected, the °ow allocations at the social
optimum and the ME are the same. Next consider a duopoly where each of these links
is owned by a di®erent provider. Using Corollary 1 and Lemma 4, it follows that the
°ow allocation at the OE, xOE, satis¯es
l1(x
OE










2 )] = l2(x
OE











Solving this together with xOE
1 + xOE
2 = 1 shows that the °ow allocation at the unique
oligopoly equilibrium is xOE = (2=3;1=3). The social surplus at the social optimum,
the monopoly equilibrium, and the oligopoly equilibrium are given by 1, 1, and 5=6,
respectively.
Before providing a more thorough analysis of the e±ciency properties of the OE, the
next proposition proves that, as claimed in the Introduction and suggested by Example
6, a change in the market structure from monopoly to duopoly in a two link network
typically reduces e±ciency.
Proposition 10 Consider a two link network where each link is owned by a di®er-
ent provider. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let (pOE;xOE) be a pure strategy OE such
that pOE
i xOE
i > 0 for some i 2 I and minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE







2 , then S(xOE)=S(xS) < 1 .
Proof. Combining the OE prices with the WE conditions, we have
l1(x
OE










2 )) = l2(x
OE











where we use the fact that minj fpOE
j +lj(xOE
j )g < R. Moreover, we can use optimality
conditions (7) to prove that a vector (xS
1;xS
























2 , the result follows.
Q.E.D.
We next quantify the e±ciency of oligopoly equilibria by providing a tight bound
on the e±ciency loss in congestion games with oligopoly pricing. As we have shown in
Section 4, such games do not always have a pure strategy OE. In the following, we ¯rst
provide bounds on congestion games that have pure strategy equilibria. We next study
e±ciency properties of mixed strategy equilibria.
5.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
We consider price competition games that have pure strategy equilibria (this set includes,
but is larger than, games with linear latency functions, see Section 4). We consider
latency functions that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Let LI denote the set of latency
functions fligi2I such that the associated congestion game has a pure strategy OE and
the individual li's satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.7 Given a parallel link network with I
links and latency functions fligi2I 2 LI, let
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig) denote the set of °ow allocations






















where xS is a social optimum given the latency functions fligi2I and R is the reservation
utility. In other words, our e±ciency metric is the ratio of the social surplus in an
equilibrium relative to the surplus in the social optimum. Following the literature on
the \price of anarchy", in particular [19], we are interested in the worst performance in









We ¯rst prove two lemmas, which reduce the set of latency functions that need to
be considered in bounding the e±ciency metric. The next lemma allows us to use the
oligopoly price characterization given in Proposition 9
Lemma 7 Let (pOE;xOE) be a pure strategy OE such that pOE
i xOE
i = 0 for all i 2 I.
Then xOE is a social optimum.
Proof. We ¯rst show that li(xOE
i ) = 0 for all i 2 I. Assume that lj(xOE
j ) > 0 for
some j 2 I. This implies that xOE
j > 0 and therefore pOE
j = 0. Since lj(xOE
j ) > 0,
it follows by Lemma 2 that for all x 2 W(p), we have xj = xOE
j . Consider increasing
pOE
j to some small ² > 0. By the upper semicontinuity of W(p), it follows that for all
x 2 W(²;pOE
¡j ), we have jxj ¡xOE
j j < ± for some ± > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 2, we have,
for all x 2 W(²;pOE
¡j ), xi ¸ xOE
i for all i 6= j. Hence, the pro¯t of the provider that owns
7More explicitly, Assumption 2 implies that if any OE (pOE;xOE) associated with fligi2I has xOE
i >
0 and li(xOE
i ) = 0, then Is = fig.
20link j is strictly higher at price vector (²;pOE
¡j ) than at pOE, contradicting the fact that
(pOE;xOE) is an OE.
Clearly xOE
j > 0 for some j and hence mini2IfpOE
i + li(xOE
i )g = pOE
j + lj(xOE
j ) = 0,
which implies by Lemma 4 that
P
i2I xOE
i = d. Using li(xOE
i ) = 0, and 0 2 @li(xOE
i ) for
all i, we have
R ¡ li(x
OE
i ) ¡ x
OE
i gli = R; 8 i 2 I;
for some gli 2 @li(xOE
i ). Hence, xOE satis¯es the su±cient optimality conditions for a
social optimum [cf. Eq. (7) with ¸S = R], and the result follows. Q.E.D.






i > 0 and
PI
i=1 xOE
i = d in the subsequent analysis.












i < d for some xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig).
Then every xOE 2
¡ ¡ !








i . Since xS is a social optimum and
every xOE 2
¡ ¡ !



















By the de¯nition of a WE, we have xOE
i ¸ 0 and R ¡ li(xOE
i ) ¸ pOE
i ¸ 0 (where pOE
i is
the price of link i at the OE) for all i. This combined with the preceding relation shows




i < d for some xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig). Let pOE be the associated
OE price. Assume that pOE
j xOE




i < d, we have by Lemma 4 that minj2Ifpj +lj(xOE
j g = R. Moreover,
by Lemma 5, it follows that pixOE
i > 0 for all i 2 I. Hence, for all s 2 S, ((pOE
i )i2Is;xOE)





subject to pi + li(xi) = R; 8 i 2 Is;
p
OE

















where Ti = fxi j pOE
i + li(xi) = Rg is either a singleton or a closed interval. Since this
is a convex problem, using the optimality conditions, we obtain
R ¡ li(x
OE
i ) ¡ x
OE
i gli = 0; 8 i 2 Is; 8 s 2 S;
where gli 2 @li(xOE
i ). By Eq. (7), it follows that xOE is a social optimum. Q.E.D.
Hence, in ¯nding a lower bound on the e±ciency metric, we can restrict ourselves,








i for some social optimum xS, and
PI
i=1 xOE
i = d for all xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig). By




Lemma 9 For a set of latency functions fligi2I, let Assumption 1 hold. Let (pOE;xOE)

















i . This implies
that xOE
j > xS
j for some j. We also have lj(xOE
j ) > lj(xS
j ). (Otherwise, we would have
lj(xS
j ) = l0
j(xS




i < d). Using the optimality conditions (2) and (7), we obtain
R ¡ lj(x
OE
j ) ¡ p
OE
j ¸ R ¡ lj(x
S
j ) ¡ x
S
j glj;
for some glj 2 @lj(xS
j ). Combining the preceding with lj(xOE
j ) > lj(xS


















j and completing the proof. Q.E.D.
5.1.1 Two Links
We ¯rst consider a parallel link network with two links owned by two service providers.
The next theorem provides a tight lower bound on r2(flig;xOE) [cf. Eq. (21)]. In the
following, we assume without loss of generality that d = 1. Also recall that latency
functions in L2 satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.










22and the bound is tight, i.e., there exists fligi=1;2 2 L2 and xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig) that attains
the lower bound in Eq. (22).
Proof. The proof follows a number of steps:









Given flig 2 L2, let xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig) and let xS be a social optimum. By Lemmas 8






i = 1. This implies that there exists
some i such that xOE
i < xS
i . Since the problem is symmetric, we can restrict ourselves










































































1 = 0; if l
S










i = 1; (32)
+ fOligopoly Equilibrium Constraintsgt; t = 1;2:
Problem (E) can be viewed as a ¯nite dimensional problem that captures the equilib-
rium and the social optimum characteristics of the in¯nite dimensional problem given in
Eq. (23). This implies that instead of optimizing over the entire function li, we optimize
over the possible values of li(¢) and @li(¢) at the equilibrium and the social optimum,
which we denote by li;l0
i;lS
i ;(lS
i )0 [i.e., (lS
i )0 is a variable that represents all possible values
of gli 2 @li(yS
i )]. The constraints of the problem guarantee that these values satisfy the
necessary optimality conditions for a social optimum and an OE. In particular, condi-




i )0 [note that the assumption li(0) = 0 is essential here]. Condition (26) is the
23optimality condition for the social optimum. Condition (29) captures the nondecreasing
assumption on the latency functions; since we are considering flig such that xOE
1 < xS
1,
we must have l1 · lS





1, the fact that l1(xOE
1 ) = l1(xS
1) = 0 implies, by Assumption 1, that 0
is the unique element of @l1(xOE
1 ). Finally, the last set of constraints are the necessary
conditions for a pure strategy OE. These are written separately for t = 1;2, for the two
cases characterized in Proposition 9, giving us two bounds, which we will show to be
equal.
More explicitly, the Oligopoly Equilibrium constraints are given by:
For t = 1: [corresponding to a lower bound for pure strategy OE, (pOE;yOE), with
minjfpOE
j + lj(yOE



























2 ) [cf. Eq. (16)].
For t = 2: [corresponding to a lower bound for pure strategy OE, (pOE;yOE), with
minjfpOE
j + lj(yOE
j )g = R],
























Note that given any feasible solution of problem (23), we have a feasible solution for
problem (E) with the same objective function value. Therefore, the optimum value of
problem (E) is indeed a lower bound on the optimum value of problem (23).
Step 2: Let (lS
i ;yS









2 < R: (35)






























2)0 = 0, then
we have using Eq. (25) that lS
i =0 for all i, again showing the result.
Next, let (li;yOE
i )i=1;2 satisfy Eq. (32) and one of the Oligopoly Equilibrium con-





2 < R: (36)
Step 3: To solve problem (E), we ¯rst relax the last constraint [Eq. (30)]. Let
(¹ lS
i ;(¹ lS
i )0;¹ li;¹ l0
i; ¹ yS
i ; ¹ yOE
i ) denote the optimal solution of the relaxed problem [problem (E)
without constraint (30)]. We show that ¹ lS
i = 0 for i = 1;2.
24Assign the Lagrange multipliers ¹S
i ;¸S;°S to Eqs. (25), (26), (27), respectively, and




(R ¡ ¹ l1¹ yOE
1 ¡ ¹ l2¹ yOE
2 )
(R ¡ ¹ lS
1 ¹ yS





S = 0 if ¹ l
S
2 > 0 (37)










2 = 0 if (¹ l
S
2)
0 > 0 (38)














1 = 0 if (¹ l
S
1)
0 > 0 (39)







(R ¡ ¹ l1¹ yOE
1 ¡ ¹ l2¹ yOE
2 )
(R ¡ ¹ lS
1 ¹ yS
















S = 0 if ¹ y
S
1 > 0 (40)






(R ¡ ¹ l1¹ yOE
1 ¡ ¹ l2¹ yOE
2 )
(R ¡ ¹ lS
1 ¹ yS












S = 0 if ¹ y
S
2 > 0 (41)
¸ 0 if ¹ y
S
2 = 0;
We ¯rst show that ¹ lS
2 = 0. If ¹ yS
2 = 0 or (¹ lS
2)0 = 0, we are done by Eq. (25). Assume
that ¹ yS
2 > 0 and (¹ lS
2)0 > 0. By Eq. (38), this implies that ¸S = ¹S
2 ¸ 0. We claim that
in this case Eq. (37) cannot be equal to 0. Assume to arrive at a contradiction that it
is. Using Step 2 and the fact that ¹ yS
2 > 0, we have ¹S
2 +¸S < 0, which is a contradiction
and shows that Eq. (37) is strictly positive. This establishes that ¹ lS
2 = 0.
We next show that ¹ lS
1 = 0. If ¹ yS
1 = 0 or (¹ lS
1)0 = 0, we are done by Eq. (25). Assume
that ¹ yS
1 > 0 and (¹ lS
1)0 > 0. Assume to arrive at a contradiction that ¹ lS
1 > 0. Since ¹ lS
2 = 0,
by Eq. (26), we have that ¹ yS
1(¹ lS
1)0 < ¹ yS
2(¹ lS
2)0, and therefore both ¹ yS
2 > 0 and (¹ lS
2)0 > 0.
Since ¹ lS
2 = 0, these imply that Eq. (25) is slack, and hence ¹S
2 = 0. By Eq. (38), this
shows ¸S¹ yS
2 = 0, and hence ¸S = 0. Furthermore, since ¹S
2 = ¸S = 0, from Eq. (41)
we have µS = 0, and from Eq. (39), we have ¹S
1 = °S. Plugging this all in Eq. (40), we
obtain a contradiction, showing that ¹ lS
1 = 0.
Step 4: Since ¹ lS
1 = 0, in view of Eq. (29), we have ¹ l1 = 0. Hence we can impose the
extra constraint l1 = 0 in problem (E) without changing the optimal function value, and
we can rewrite the constraint in Eq. (30) as l0
1 = 0. Using in addition ¹ lS
2 = 0, we see
that for t = 1;2,
r
OE





























which follows because any vector (yOE
i ;li;l0
i) with l1 = 0 and l0
1 = 0 that satis¯es Eqs.
(33) or (34) is a feasible solution to the above problem. It is straightforward to show that
the optimal solution of this problem is (¹ l2;¹ l0
2; ¹ yOE
1 ; ¹ yOE




3), and therefore it
follows that rOE
2;1 = rOE












We next show that this bound is tight. Consider the latency functions l1(x) = 0,
and l2(x) = 3
2x. As shown in Example 6, the corresponding OE is xOE = (2
3; 1
3), and the
social optimum is xS = (1;0). Hence, the e±ciency metric for these latency functions is














We next consider the general case where we have a parallel link network with I links
and S service providers, where provider s owns a set of links Is ½ I. It can be seen by
augmenting a two link network with links that have latency functions
l(x) =
½
0 if x = 0;
1 otherwise;
that the lower bound in the general network case can be no higher than 5
6. However, this
is a degenerate example in the sense that at the OE, the °ows of the links with latency
functions given above are equal to 0. We next give an example of an I link network
which has positive °ows on all links at the OE and an e±ciency metric of 5/6.
Example 7 Consider an I link network. Let the total °ow be d = 1 and the reservation
utility be R = 1. The latency functions are given by
l1(x) = 0; li(x) =
3
2
(I ¡ 1)x; i = 2;:::;I:
The unique social optimum for this example is xS = [1;0;:::;0]. It can be seen that the




















The next theorem generalizes Theorem 1 to a parallel link network with I ¸ 2 links.
Theorem 2 Consider a general parallel link network with I links and S service providers,









and the bound is tight, i.e., there exists fligi2I 2 LI and xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig) that attains
the lower bound in Eq. (42).
Proof. The proof again follows a number of steps:









Given flig 2 L2, let xOE 2
¡ ¡ !
OE(flig) and let xS be a social optimum. By Lemmas 8 and






i = 1. Hence there
exists some i such that xOE
i < xS
i . Without loss of any generality, we restrict ourselves
to the set of latency functions fligi2I 2 LI such that xOE
1 < xS
1. Similar to the proof of
Proposition 1, it can be seen that Problem (43) can be lower bounded by the optimum
value of the following ¯nite dimensional problem:
r
OE




























































1 = 0; if l
S
1 = 0; (50)
Is = f1g for some s if l
S
1 = 0; (51)
+ fOligopoly Equilibrium Constraintsgt; t = 1;2:
27The new feature relative to the two link case is the presence of Is's as choice variables
to allow a choice over possible distribution of links across service providers (with the
constraint
S
s Is = I left implicit). The oligopoly equilibrium constraints, which are
again written separately for t = 1;2 for the two cases in Proposition 9, depend on Ii's.
In addition, we have added constraint (51) to impose Assumption 2 (recall that xOE
1 > 0
by Lemma 5).
Step 2: Let (¹ lS
i ;(¹ lS
i )0;¹ li;¹ l0
i; ¹ yS
i ; ¹ yOE
i ) be an optimal solution of the relaxed version of
the preceding problem [i.e., without constraint (50)].
Note that the constraints that involve (lS
i ;(lS
i )0;yS
i ) for i = 2;:::;n are decoupled
and have the same structure as in problem (E). Therefore, by the same argument used
to show ¹ lS
2 = 0 in Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 1, one can show that ¹ lS
i = 0 for
each i = 2;:::;n. Similarly, one can extend the same argument given in the proof of
Proposition 1 to show that ¹ lS
1 = 0.
Step 3: Since ¹ lS
1 = 0, it follows that ¹ l1 = 0 [Eq. (49)], and we can assume without
loss of generality that ¹ l0
1 = 0 and I1 = f1g. Therefore, using the price characterization
from Proposition 9, the structure of the problem simpli¯es to
r
OE































where we have also used the fact that ¹ lS
i = 0, for i = 2;:::;I.
The ¯rst set of constraints are due to the convexity assumptions on the li. Similar
to the two link case, the second set of constraints are due to the oligopoly equilibrium
constraints (given ¹ l0
1 = 0 see the OE price characterization in Proposition 9).
Step 4: Let ((¹ li;¹ l0
i)i=2;:::;I;(¹ yOE
i )i=1;:::;I) denote an optimal solution of the preceding
problem. Assign the Lagrange multipliers ¹i;¸i;° and µ consecutively to the constraints







= 0 if ¹ y
OE
1 > 0 (53)







+ ¹i + ¸i = 0 if ¹ li > 0 (54)
¸ 0 if ¹ li = 0;
28and for i = 2;:::;I,
¡¹i¹ y
OE










´2 + ¸i¹ y
OE
i = 0 if ¹ l
0
i > 0 (55)
¸ 0 if ¹ l
0
i = 0:
By feasibility, we have ¹ yOE
1 > 0. Using symmetry, it can also be seen that ¹ yOE
i > 0.
Hence, by Eq. (53), we have ° = 0, which together with Eq. (55) implies that ¸i = ¹i
for all i = 2;:::;I.
Moreover, by Eq. (54), we have ¹i > 0, showing that ¹ li = ¹ yOE
i ¹ l0
i for each i = 2;:::;I
(i.e., the corresponding constraint is not slack). This implies that




i = R; 8 i = 2;:::;I:
Hence ¹ li = R=2 and ¹ yOE
i ¹ l0
i = R=2 for each i = 2;:::;I: We can also see that constraint
(52) is not slack at ((¹ li;¹ l0
i)i=2;:::;I;(¹ yOE
i )i=1;:::;I) (otherwise, we can improve the objective








Combining with the feasibility constraint ¹ yOE
1 = 1 ¡
PI
j=2 ¹ yi









































































Although Example 7 and Theorem 2 show that the e±ciency loss in an arbitrarily
large network (i.e., with I ! 1) can be as high as in the two link network, the same
is not the case if we start with a given I link network and replicate it n times (also
increasing d to nd). In this case, it can be shown, as in analyses of the limit behavior of
oligopoly models (e.g., [28], [14], [22], [39], [40]), that as n ! 1, the e±ciency metric
tends to 1.
295.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
As we illustrated in Section 4, congestion games with latency functions that satisfy
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 may not have a pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium (cf. Example
3). Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 8, such games always have a mixed strategy
equilibrium. In this section, we discuss the e±ciency properties of mixed strategy OE.
Although there has been much less interest in the e±ciency properties of mixed
strategy equilibria, two di®erent types of e±ciency metrics present themselves as natural
candidates. The ¯rst considers the worst realization of the strategies, while the second
focuses on average ine±ciency across di®erent realizations of mixed strategies. We refer
to the ¯rst metric as worst-realization metric, and denote it by ~ rW
I (flig), and to the
second as the average metric, and denote it by ~ rA
I (flig). We discuss both of these
brie°y.
Given a set of latency functions fligi2I , let OM(flig) denote the set of mixed strategy
equilibria. For some ¹ 2 OM(flig), let Mi(¹) denote the support of ¹i as de¯ned before
in Example 3 [in particular, recall that Mi = fp j ¹0
i(p) > 0g]. Further, let
¡ ¡ !
OEm(flig;¹) = fx j x 2 W(p); for some p s.t. pi 2 Mi(¹) for all ig:
We de¯ne the worst-realization e±ciency metric as
~ r
W










where rI is given by Eq. (21).
Similarly, the average e±ciency metric is de¯ned as
~ r
A








OE (p))d¹1 ¢ ¢ ¢ d¹S:
In the next example, we show that the worst-realization e±ciency metric for games
with no pure strategy equilibrium can be arbitrarily low.
Example 3 (continued) Consider the prices p1 = R and p2 = R(1 ¡ ±) that satisfy
pi 2 Mi for the unique mixed strategy equilibrium given in Example 3 as ² ! 0. The
WE at these prices is given by
x
OE = (1 ¡ ±;±);
and the worst-realization e±ciency metric is
~ r
W
I (flig) = 1 ¡ ±
2;
which as ± ! 1 goes to 0.
Next consider the average e±ciency metric, ~ rA
I (flig). Once again, consider the limit
as ² ! 0. Recall that we have characterized the unique mixed strategy OE above, and













1 if p1 < p2
1 ¡
±(p1¡p2)










± (p1 ¡ p2)
R
d¹1 £ d¹2
Thus to calculate ~ rA








































(1 ¡ ±)Rd¹2 (p2)
¸




















dp1 ¡ R(1 ¡ ±)
¸
= (1 ¡ ±)
2 ¡ (1 ¡ ±) + (1 ¡ ±)[lnR ¡ ln((1 ¡ ±)R)]
= ¡(1 ¡ ±)± ¡ (1 ¡ ±)ln(1 ¡ ±)
It can be calculated that A reaches a maximum of approximately 0:16 for ± ¼ 0:8.
Therefore, in this example, ~ rA
I (flig) reaches 0:84 ¼ 5=6 (in fact, slightly greater than
5=6). We conjecture, but are unable to prove, that 5=6 is also a lower bound for the
average e±ciency metric, ~ rA
I (flig), in mixed strategy OE. This is left as an open research
question.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an analysis of competition in congested networks. We es-
tablished a number of results. First, despite the potential ine±ciencies of °ow-routing
without prices, price-setting by a monopolist always achieves the social optimum. Sec-
ond, and in contrast to the monopoly result, oligopoly equilibria where multiple service
providers compete are typically ine±cient. Third, there is a tight bound of 5/6 on ine±-
ciency in pure strategy oligopoly equilibria. This bound is obtained even for arbitrarily
large parallel link networks. Finally, pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist when some
latency functions are highly convex. Mixed strategy equilibria can lead to arbitrarily
ine±cient realizations.
A number of concluding comments are useful:
31² Our motivating example has been the °ow of information in a communication net-
work, but our results apply equally to tra±c assignment problems and oligopoly
in product markets with negative externalities, congestion or snob e®ects (as orig-
inally suggested by Veblen [38]).
² Our analysis has been quite general, in particular, allowing for constant latencies
and capacity constraints. Some of the analysis simpli¯es considerably when we
specialize the network to increasing and real-valued (non-capacity constrained) la-
tencies. On the other hand, the assumption that li(0) = 0 is important for our
e±ciency bounds. This can be relaxed to derive a slightly lower bound on the e±-
ciency in pure strategy OE, but this signi¯cantly complicates the characterization
of the form of equilibrium prices in OE (unless we assume that all latency functions
are increasing rather than non-decreasing). We leave this for future work.
² One simplifying feature of our analysis is the assumption that users are \homo-
geneous" in the sense that the same reservation utility, R, applies to all users. It
is possible to conduct a similar analysis with elastic and heterogeneous users (or
tra±c), but this raises a number of new and exciting challenges. For example,
monopoly or oligopoly providers might want to use non-linear pricing (designed
as a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility constraints of di®erent types of
users, e.g., [42]). This is an important research area for understanding equilibria in
communication networks, where users often have heterogeneous quality of service
requirements.
² While we have established that worst-realization e±ciency metric in mixed strategy
oligopoly equilibria can be arbitrarily low, a bound for average e±ciency metric is
an open research question.
327 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4
If (pME;xME) is an ME, then it is an SPE by de¯nition. Let (pME;xME) be an SPE.




ME) < ¦(p; ~ x): (56)





i=1 ¹ xi for all x; ¹ x 2 W(p). By Lemma 2, it follows that
¦(p; ~ x) = ¦(p;x) for all x 2 W(p), which contradicts the fact that (pME;xME) is an
SPE.






¹ xi; for some ^ x; ¹ x 2 W(p): (57)
For this case, we have pi = R for all i 2 ¹ I, where
¹ I = fi 2 I j 9 x; ¹ x 2 W(p) with xi 6= ¹ xig;
[cf. Eq. (5)]. To see this, note that since
PI
i=1 ^ xi < d, the WE optimality conditions for
^ x [cf. Eq. (2)] hold with ¸ = 0. Assume that ~ p < R. By Lemma 2, li(xi) = 0 for all
i 2 ¹ I. If bCi = 1 for some i 2 ¹ I, we get a contradiction by Eq. (2). Otherwise, Eq. (2)
implies that ^ xi = bCi for all i 2 ¹ I. Since ^ xi = ¹ xi for all i = 2 ¹ I, this contradicts Eq. (57).
We show that given ± > 0, there exists some ² > 0 such that
¦(p
²;x








pi i = 2 ¹ I;
R ¡ ² i 2 ¹ I: (59)
The preceding relation together with Eq. (56) contradicts the fact that (pME;xME) is
an SPE, thus establishing our claim.

















This implies that there exists some j 2 ¹ I such that x²
j < ~ xj (which also implies that
x²
j < bCj). We use the WE optimality conditions [Eq. (2)] for ~ x and x² to obtain the
following:
33² There exists some ~ ¸ ¸ 0 such that for some i 2 ¹ I,
R ¡ li(~ xi) ¡ pi = 0 ¸ ~ ¸;
where we used the facts that li(~ xi) = 0, pi = R [cf. Lemma 2] and ~ xi > 0 for some
i 2 ¹ I [cf. Eq. (56)]. Since ~ ¸ = 0, we have, for all i = 2 ¹ I,
R ¡ li(~ xi) ¡ pi · 0 if ~ xi · bCi; (62)
¸ 0 if ~ xi = bCi:






j < ~ xj and pj = R ¡ ²), and for all i = 2 ¹ I,
R ¡ li(x
²
i) ¡ pi · ¸² if x
²
i = 0; (64)
¸ ¸² if x
²
i > 0:
If ¸² = 0, then by Eq. (63) and the fact that lj(~ xj) = 0 (Lemma 2), we obtain
lj(x
²
j) ¸ ² > 0 = lj(~ xj);
which is a contradiction. If ¸² > 0, then
PI
i=1 x²
i = d. Assume ¯rst that x²
i · ~ xi for all
















which yields a contradiction by Eq. (61). Assume next that x²
k > ~ xk for some k = 2 ¹ I. By
Eqs. (62) and (64), we have
R ¡ lk(x
²
k) ¡ pk ¸ ¸
²;
R ¡ lk(~ xk) ¡ pk · 0;
which together implies that lk(~ xk) > lk(x²
k), yielding a contradiction and proving Eq.
(60).
Since W(p) is an upper semicontinuous correspondence and the ith component of
W(p) is uniquely de¯ned for all i = 2 ¹ I, it follows that xi(¢) is continuous at p for all












































pi~ xi ¡ ±;
where the last inequality holds for su±ciently small ², establishing (58), and completing
the proof. Q.E.D.
348 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 8
We will prove Proposition 8 using Theorem 5* of Dasgupta and Maskin [10]. We start
by stating a slightly simpli¯ed version of this theorem. Consider an S player game. Let
the strategy space of player s, denoted by Ps, be a closed interval of Rns for some ns 2 N,







Ps. To state Theorem 5* in [10], we need the following three de¯nitions.
De¯nition A1 Let ¼(p) =
P




¼(p) · ¼(¹ p):
De¯nition A2 The pro¯t function ¼s(ps;p¡s) is weakly lower semicontinuous in ps if
for all ¹ ps 2 Ps, there exists ¸ 2 [0;1] such that for all p¡s 2 P¡s,
¸lim inf
ps#¹ ps
¼s(ps;p¡s) + (1 ¡ ¸)lim inf
ps"¹ ps
¼s(ps;p¡s) ¸ ¼s(¹ ps;p¡s):
De¯nition A3 For each player s, let Ds 2 N. For each D with 0 · D · Ds and each
k 6= s with 1 · k · S, let fD
sk be a one-to-one, continuous function. Let ¹ P(s) be a subset
of P, such that
¹ P(s) =
©





In other words, ¹ P(s) is a lower dimensional subset of P (which is also of Lebesgue
measure zero). Theorem 5* in [10] states:
Theorem A1 (Dasgupta-Maskin) Assume that ¼s(ps;p¡s) is continuous in p except
on a subset P ¤¤of ¹ P(s), weakly lower semicontinuous in ps for all s and bounded, and
that ¼(p) is upper semicontinuous in p. Then the game [(Ps;¼s);s = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;S] has a
mixed strategy equilibrium.
We show that our game satis¯es the hypotheses of Theorem A1. We will select a
function x¤ (ps;p¡s) from the set of Wardrop equilibria, W (ps;p¡s), such that
¼s(ps;p¡s) = ¦s(ps;p¡s;x
¤ (ps;p¡s)); 8 s 2 S;
that will satisfy these hypotheses. First, since Ps = [0;R]
Is and
P
i xi(p) · d for all p,
and all x 2 W(p), ¼s(ps;p¡s) is clearly bounded.













j(¹ ps;p¡s); 8 ¹ ps ¸ 0; 8 p¡s ¸ 0: (65)




¼s(ps;p¡s) = ¼s(¹ ps;p¡s); 8 ¹ ps ¸ 0; 8 p¡s ¸ 0;
hence ensuring that ¼s(ps;p¡s) = ¦s(ps;p¡s;x¤ (ps;p¡s)) is weakly lower semicontinuous.








xj(p); 8 p ¸ 0; 8 x 2 W(p): (66)













s; ¹ p¡s) !
P
j2Is x¤
j(¹ ps; ¹ p¡s) for some sequence
fpn








j(^ ps; ¹ p¡s);
for some ^ ps < ps, contradicting the monotonicity of WE by Proposition 2.
Next, we show that ¼s(ps;p¡s) is continuous in p except on a set P ¤¤. We de¯ne the
set
P
¤¤ = fp j W(p) is not a singletong:
By the upper semicontinuity of W(p), we see that ¼s(ps;p¡s) is continuous at all p = 2 P ¤¤.
Moreover, by Lemma 2, it follows that P ¤¤ ½ ¹ P, where
¹ P = fp j pj = pk; for some j 6= kg [ fp j pj = R; for some jg;
which is a lower dimensional set. This establishes the desired condition for Theorem A1.










is continuous at all p. Given some p ¸ 0, de¯ne ¹ I as in Eq. (5) of Lemma 2. If ¹ I = ;,
then we automatically have that ¼ is continuous at p. Assume that ¹ I 6= ;. Since xOE
i (¢)
is continuous at p for all i = 2 ¹ I and pj = pk for all j; k 2 ¹ I, it is su±cient to show that P
i2¹ I x¤
























Since xi(¢) is continuous at p for all i = 2 ¹ I, we have ~ d(pn) ! d(p) =
P




i2¹ I bCi > d ¡ ~ d(p). Since x¤(p) is the maximum l1-norm element of W(p) [cf.
Eq. (66)] and li(x¤
i) = 0 for all i 2 ¹ I, this implies that
P
i2I x¤




i(pn) = d, establishing the claim.
²
P






i2¹ I bCi. Moreover, for all ² > 0, there exists some n su±ciently
















The preceding enable us to apply the theorem, completing the proof. Q.E.D.
9 Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 6
We ¯rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 10 Let (pOE;xOE) be an OE such that minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE
j )g < R. Let As-
sumptions 1 and 2 hold. If pOE
j xOE
j > 0 for some j 2 I, then W(pOE) is a singleton.
Proof. Since pOE
j xOE
j > 0 for some j 2 I, it follows, by Lemma 5, that pOE
i xOE
i > 0
for all i 2 I. We ¯rst show that for all x 2 W(pOE), we have xi · xOE
i for all i. If
li(xOE
i ) > 0, then by Lemma 2, xi = xOE
i for all x 2 W(pOE). If li(xOE
i ) = 0, then
Is = fig for some s by the fact that xOE
i > 0 and Assumption 2, which implies that
xi · xOE
i by the de¯nition of an OE (cf. De¯nition 10).
Since minj fpOE
j + lj(xOE
j )g < R, we have
PI
i=1 xOE
i = d. Moreover, the fact that
xi · xOE
i for all x 2 W(pOE) implies that minj fpOE
j +lj(xj)g < R as well, and therefore
PI
i=1 xi = d, showing that xi = xOE
i for all x 2 W(pOE), for all i 2 I. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. We ¯rst prove this result for a network with two links. Assume










Let f²kg be a scalar sequence with ²k # 0. Consider the sequence fx1(²k)g where x1(²k)
is the load of link 1 at a WE given price vector (pOE
1 + ²k;pOE
2 ). By Proposition 1 and
Lemma 10, the WE correspondence W(p) is upper-semicontinuous and W(pOE) is a











Similarly, let x1(¡²k) be the load of link 1 at a WE given price vector (pOE
1 ¡ ²k;pOE
2 ).














































1 ) = l
¡
1 (xOE











Consider the pro¯t of service provider 1, ¦1(pOE
1 ;pOE




























1 is a maximum of ¦1(¢;pOE









































which is a contradiction by Eq. (71), thus showing that we have l
+
2 (xOE




We next consider a network with multiple links. As in Eqs. (69) and (70), we de¯ne












































Let 1 2 Is, and without loss of any generality, assume that all li's for i 2 Is are smooth









































To arrive at a contradiction, assume that l
+
j (xOE
j ) > l
¡
j (xOE
j ) for some j = 2 Is. Then







for all i 2 Is.





































which are inconsistent with Eq. (76), leading to a contradiction. This proves the claim
for the multiple link case. Q.E.D.
10 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 9
We ¯rst assume that minj fpOE
j +lj(xOE
j )g < R. Consider service provider s and assume
without loss of generality that 1 2 Is. Since pOE
j xOE
j > 0 for some j 2 Is0 and s0 2 S,
it follows by Lemma 5 that pOE
i xOE
i > 0 for all i 2 I. Together with Lemma 4, this
implies that ((pOE





subject to l1(x1) + p1 = li(xi) + pi; i 2 Is ¡ f1g;
l1(x1) + p1 = li(xi) + p
OE
i ; i = 2 Is;




39By Lemma 6, we have that li is continuously di®erentiable in a neighborhood of xOE
i
for all i (since the gradient mapping of a convex function is continuous over the set the
function is di®erentiable, see Rockafellar [29]). Therefore, by examining the Karush-




























showing the result in Eq. (16).
We next assume that minj fpOE
j +lj(xOE
j )g = R: Using the assumption that pOE
j xOE
j >
0 for some j 2 I and Lemma 4, this implies that
p
OE
i = R ¡ li(x
OE
i ); 8 i;





subject to xi 2 Ti; 8 i = 2 Is X
i2I
xi · d; (82)
where Ti = fxi j pOE
i + li(xi) = Rg is either a singleton or a closed interval. Since this
is a convex problem, using the optimality conditions, we obtain
R ¡ li(x
OE
i ) ¡ x
OE
i gli = µs; 8 i 2 Is;
where µs ¸ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (82), and gli 2
@li(xOE
i ). Since l
¡
i (xOE
i ) · gli, the preceding implies
p
OE
i = R ¡ li(x
OE






i ); 8 i 2 I;
proving (17).
To prove (18), consider some i 2 I with Is = fig for some s and the sequence of price
vectors fpkg with pk = (pOE
i ¡ ²k;pOE
¡i ). Let fxkg be a sequence such that xk 2 W(pk)
for all k. By the upper semicontinuity of W(p), it follows that xk ! ¹ x with ¹ x 2 W(pOE)
and ¹ x · xOE (see the proof of Lemma 10). Moreover, by Lemma 2, we have xk
i ¸ xOE
i
for all k, which implies that ¹ xi ¸ xOE
i , showing that xk
i ! xOE
i . We can now use Eqs.
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